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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
 
Mark Clark, the appellant, pled guilty to an indictment 
charging that, in contravention of 21 U.S.C.S 841(a)(1), he 
possessed with intent to distribute more thanfifty grams of 
cocaine base ("crack"). As part of the plea agreement, Clark 
undertook to assist law enforcement officers in their efforts 
to gather evidence against and prosecute others. In 
exchange for that undertaking, the government agreed that, 
if satisfied that Clark's assistance was substantial, it 
would, at the time of Clark's sentencing, file motions1 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C.S 3553(e) 
authorizing the District Court to impose a sentence lower 
than the otherwise applicable sentencing guideline range 
and lower than any otherwise applicable statutory 
minimum sentence. Clark provided the pr omised 
assistance. The government filed the pr omised motions. At 
sentencing it was determined that the guideline offense 
level was 29 -- signifying a guideline range of 108 to 135 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The word "motions," in the plural, is employed here to make it clear 
that the government, in filing what in or dinary practice is a single 
document enabling a sentencing court to depart downward below both 
the guideline range and any statutory minimum in recognition of a 
defendant's cooperation, is as a formal matter to be understood as 
transmitting to the court two conceptually distinct (albeit integrally 
related) authorizations/recommendations-- one under U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1 
and the other under 18 U.S.C. S 3553(e). This conceptual distinction has 
important real-world implications, as United States v. Melendez, 518 U.S. 
120 (1996), affirming this court's decision, 55 F.3d (3rd Cir. 1995), 
illustrates: a government motion that invokes U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1, but not 
18 U.S.C. S 3553(e), does not authorize a sentencing court to depart 
downward below the statutory minimum. 
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months -- and that the statutory mandatory minimum was 
120 months. The District Court imposed a ter m of 
incarceration of 90 months. 
 
On appeal Clark contends that the District Court, in 
calculating an appropriate downward departure, chose as 
its base line the 120-month statutory minimum rather than 
the 108-month bottom of the guideline -- a choice resulting 
in a sentence appreciably longer than it would have been 
had the District Court calculated the downwar d departure 
from a base line of 108 months. The methodology adopted 
by the District Court in calculating the downwar d 
departure was, so Clark contends, incompatible with the 
letter and the rationale of the pertinent pr ovisions of Title 
18 and of the guidelines. 
 
The government supports the methodology used by the 
District Court, contending that it was in har mony with (a) 
the pertinent provisions of Title 18 and of the guidelines 
and (b) the case law construing those provisions. Further, 
the government points out that at sentencing Clark 
interposed no objection to the District Court's methodology 
and, therefore, so the government ar gues, the methodology 
is not assailable on appeal unless it is properly 
characterizable not merely as error but as"plain" error -- 
and this, the government insists, it assur edly was not. 
Finally, the government argues that, even supposing there 
had been plain error, whether the District Court used 120 
months or 108 months as its point of departur e made no 
difference with respect to the sentence actually imposed: as 
the government reads the recor d at sentencing, the District 
Court determined that a two-level downwar d departure was 
appropriate, and, since both 120 months and 108 months 
fall within offense level 29's guideline range, a two-level 
downward departure from either 120 months or 108 
months would have brought the court to of fense level 27, 
and a consequent range of 87 to 108 months, within which 
range the court selected 90 months as the pr oper sentence. 
 
In his reply brief, Clark argues that"plain error" 
jurisprudence is inapplicable. He contends that the 
asserted error of the District Court was not one that he can 
properly be required to have objected to at the sentencing 
hearing because "the issue . . . did not arise until after the 
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district court had granted the government's[downward 
departure] motions . . . and imposed sentence." 
 
I. The Proceedings in the District Court 
 
At Clark's sentencing the District Court deter mined that, 
but for the government's submission of downwar d 
departure motions under 18 U.S.C. S 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. 
S 5K1.1, it would have been (1) requir ed by statute (21 
U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(A)(iii)) to impose a ter m of incarceration of 
at least 120 months, and (2) required by the guidelines 
applicable to a Criminal History Category III of fender with 
an offense level of 29 to impose a ter m of incarceration of 
between 108 and 135 months. In the absence of the 
government's downward departure motions, compliance 
with both of these constraints would have meant that the 
District Court would have been required to sentence Clark 
to a term of incarceration of between 120 and 135 months. 
The District Court put it this way: 
 
        All right. The warrants [sic] 2 for the government's 
       downward departure motion, I, of course would be 
       limited to 10 years, make it 120 and 135, because of 
       the government's downward departur e motion, I am 
       not so bound and I can go below the 120 months or I 
       can even go below the level 29. 
 
Immediately thereafter the District Court "committed 
[Clark] to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a term 
of 90 months." After detailing the other aspects of the 
sentence (five years of post-custody supervised r elease; 
$750 fine; $100 special assessment), the District Court 
advised Clark of his right to appeal, and then said: 
 
       The departure that I had reached is a substantial one. 
       I have gone below the mandatory minimum as stated 
       and in addition, gone up [sic] two levels, at the bottom 
       of that range, approximately to a 90 month instead of 
       120 months. 
 
Thereafter, following an expression of "hope that the 
defendant is correct in saying he'll tur n his life around" on 
release, the court inquired: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The phrase "The warrants" was pr esumably an error in transcription. 
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       Anything further? 
 
Defense counsel responded: 
       Your Honor, will the Court be making a 
       recommendation as to Fairton and the drug r esidential 
       treatment program? 
 
The court replied: "I said that I would so r ecommend and 
I will." After defense counsel said, "Thank you, Judge," the 
court inquired again: "Anything further? Government?" 
Government counsel said: "Nothing, Y our Honor." The court 
then observed: "Okay. I hope Mr. Clark is able to turn his 
life around. He certainly has the opportunity to do so." And 
the sentencing hearing ended. 
 
II. The Contentions of the Parties  
 
Clark, in the Summary of Argument in his opening brief 
on appeal, outlines his position as follows: 
 
        In contrast to the approach followed by the district 
       court, the Sentencing Guidelines provide that the 
       granting of a motion under 18 U.S.C S 3553(e)"waives" 
       the statutory minimum. Thereafter, sentence must be 
       imposed based upon the guideline range without 
       reference to that minimum term. Thus, where the 
       government has moved for a downward departure 
       under U.S.S.G. 5K1.1 in addition to having moved to 
       waive a statutory minimum, the starting point for 
       calculating the 5K1.1 departure should be the bottom 
       of the guideline range. This approach is r equired by the 
       relevant statutory and guidelines provisions, by the 
       United States Supreme Court's holding in United States 
       v. Melendez, 518 U.S. 120 (1996),3  and by the 
       structure and goals of the guidelines as expr essed by 
       the Sentencing Commission. As the district court 
       misapplied the guidelines by calculating the departure 
       from the statutory minimum term, the Court should 
       remand this case with instructions that the court 
       resentence the defendant by calculating the downward 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. As to the holding in Melendez, see footnote 1, supra. 
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       departure under U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1 fr om the applicable 
       guideline range of 108 to 135 months.4  
 
The government's response to Clark's ar guments is two- 
fold: 
 
First: The government contends that, contrary to Clark's 
argument, the pertinent statutory and guidelines provisions 
do not authorize -- much less require-- a sentencing 
court, when fashioning a downward departur e pursuant to 
government motions under 18 U.S.C. S 3553(e) and 
U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1, to "waive" the statutory minimum as the 
point of departure when that statutory minimum is higher 
than the bottom of the applicable guideline range but lower 
than the top of the guideline range. In such a situation -- 
of which the case at bar, with a statutory minimum of 120 
months, and a guideline range of 108 to 135 months, is an 
example -- the sentencing court is, according to the 
government, required by U.S.S.G.S 5G.1(c)(2),5 to narrow 
the guideline range to the segment between the statutory 
minimum and the top of the guideline range (in the case at 
bar, 120 to 135 months) and then calculate any downward 
departure with that narrowed guideline range as its point of 
departure. The government further contends that its 
reading of the pertinent statutory and guidelines provisions 
is consonant with the approach taken in United States v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The argument advanced by Clark is somewhat amplified in footnote 7, 
infra. 
 
5. U.S.S.G. S 5G1.1. Sentencing on a Single Count of Conviction 
 
       (a) Where the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than 
       the minimum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily 
       authorized maximum sentence shall be the guideline sentence. 
 
       (b) Where a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than 
       the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily 
       required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence. 
 
       (c) In any other case, the sentence may be imposed at any point 
       within the applicable guideline range, provided that the sentence -
- 
 
       (1) is not greater than the statutorily authorized maximum 
       sentence, and 
 
       (2) is not less than any statutorily requir ed minimum sentence. 
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Hayes, 5 F. 3d 292 (7th Cir. 1993), and followed in United 
States v. Head, 178 F. 3d 1205 (11th Cir .), reh'g and reh'g 
en banc denied, ___ F.3d ___ (11th Cir. 1999). 
 
Second: The government contends, in the alternative, 
that, not having presented to the District Court his 
objection to the District Court's mode of calculating the 
downward departure, Clark can only complain on appeal if 
the District Court's action was "plain err or." Even if the 
District Court's action be deemed "error"-- which the 
government denies -- it cannot, in the gover nment's view, 
be regarded as "plain error." And even a "plain error," the 
government further contends, is not subject to appellate 
remediation unless it is one that "must have affected the 
outcome of the district court proceedings," United States v. 
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993), which this asserted error 




Counsel for appellant Clark did not advise the District 
Court, when the court announced the 90-month sentence, 
that counsel understood the court to have taken 120 
months as the starting point for its downwar d departure 
calculations and that the proper starting point was 108 
months. Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pr ocedure 
instructs that: "Plain errors or defects af fecting substantial 
rights may be noticed although they were not br ought to 
the attention of the court." But the Supr eme Court has 
instructed that: "At a minimum, a court of appeals cannot 
correct an error pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless the error is 
clear under current law." United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 
725, 734 (1993). 
 
Clark contends that "it is clear that the district court 
plainly misapplied 18 U.S.C. S 3553(e) and the guidelines 
. . ." However, the clarity contended for by Clark is not 
reflected in the relevant case law. In 1993, six years before 
Clark's sentencing, the Seventh Circuit had considered a 
cognate challenge to a sentencing court's use of the 
statutory mandatory minimum, rather than the guideline 
range, as the point of departure for calculation of a 
downward departure. United States v. Hayes, 5 F.3d 292 
(7th Cir. 1993). The circumstances in Hayes's case were 
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much like those in Clark's, except that the gover nment only 
moved under 18 U.S.C. S 3553(e) -- not under U.S.S.G. 
S 5K1.1 as well -- and the statutory mandatory minimum of 
60 months was higher than the top of the guidelines range. 
The Seventh Circuit said this: 
 
        After the hearing, the district court granted the 
       government's motion and reduced Hayes' sentence 
       from 60 to 47 months. The court calculated its 
       downward departure by working backwar d from Hayes' 
       60-month sentence. The court first observed that the 
       lowest United States Sentencing Guidelines (the 
       "Guidelines") offense level for which a 60-month 
       sentence could have been given is 24. Departing 
       downward two levels for Hayes' substantial assistance 
       results in an offense level of 22, which carries a 
       sentencing range of 41 to 51 months. Hayes' 47-month 
       sentence falls within that range. Hayes appeals his 
       reduced sentence, arguing that the method used by the 
       district court to calculate his downward departure 
       violates 18 U.S.C. S 3553(e). . . . 
 
        Hayes argues that when a district court departs 
       below the mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 
       18 U.S.C. S 3553(e), the resulting sentence must be 
       within the Guidelines range appropriate for the offense 
       and the offender's criminal history category. Because 
       his original offense level was 16 and his criminal 
       history category is I, Hayes contends that the district 
       court was constrained by the resulting 21 to 27 month 
       range. Hayes bases his argument on the portion of 
       S 3553(e) that states: "Such sentence shall be imposed 
       in accordance with the guidelines and policy 
       statements issued by the Sentencing Commission 
       . . . ." 18 U.S.C. S 3553(e) (referring to sentences 
       imposed below the statutory minimum for substantial 
       assistance). Hayes' argument is unavailing, however, 
       because his 47-month sentence was imposed in 
       accordance with the guidelines. 
 
        "Where a statutorily requir ed minimum sentence is 
       greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline 
       range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall 
       be the guideline sentence." U.S.S.G. S 5G1.1(b) 
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       (emphasis supplied). Therefore, when the district court 
       originally sentenced Hayes, the statutory mandatory 
       minimum sentence of 60 months became Hayes' 
       Guidelines range, albeit a narrow one. The 21 to 27 
       range no longer applied. The appropriate starting point 
       for Hayes' downward departure was 60 months, and 
       the district court properly began there. 
 
5 F.3d at 294-95 (footnote omitted). 
 
In June of 1999, a month after Clark was sentenced, the 
Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Head , 178 F.3d 1205 
(11th Cir. 1999), considered a case closely similar to Hayes 
-- except that, as in the case at bar, the government filed 
motions both under 18 U.S.C. S 3553(e) and under U.S.S.G. 
S 5K1.1 -- and found the Hayes analysis persuasive. 
 
Clark argues that the Hayes-Head appr oach is "legally 
erroneous, and should not command this Court's 
adherence." But Clark has not pointed to any decisions that 
reject, or substantially diverge from, Hayes and/or Head.6 
 
Notwithstanding the dearth of supportive case law, 
Clark's challenge to Hayes-Head (capsulized in Clark's 
Summary of Argument, quoted in the text, supra, at 
footnote 4, and summarized in somewhat greater detail 
here in the margin, at footnote 7), whether or not ultimately 
found persuasive, must be acknowledged to be at least a 
plausible line of argument.7 And so it is within the range of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Cf. United States v. Schaffer, 110 F. 3d 530 (8th Cir, 1997), and 
United 
States v. Aponte, 36 F.3d 1050 (11th Cir . 1994). 
 
7. In summary, the main line of Clark's ar gument runs as follows: 
 
       (1) 18 U.S.C. S3553(e) instructs that, following the filing by the 
       government of a motion authorizing the sentencing court to "impose 
       a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum 
       sentence, . . . sentence shall be imposed in accor dance with the 
       guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
       Commission pursuant to" 28 U.S.C. S 994. 
 
       (2) The Sentencing Commission's Application Note 7 following 
       U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1 (the guideline applicable to Clark) provides that: 
 
       Where a mandatory (statutory) minimum sentence applies, this 
       mandatory minimum sentence may be "waived" and a lower 
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possibility that, as and when the issue comes to this court 
in a form requiring its resolution, this court will not 
subscribe to the approach taken by the Seventh and 
Eleventh Circuits. Alternatively, it is possible that the 
Supreme Court, if it has occasion to examine the issue, will 
not be persuaded that the Hayes-Head analysis has merit. 
However, Clark's difficulty on this appeal is that we can 
find no basis for concluding that the methodology employed 
by the District Court in sentencing Clark -- a methodology 
in conformity with Hayes-Head -- was at the time of 
sentencing, or is today, an "error [which was] clear under 
current law." Olano, 507 U.S. at 534. 
 
Clark argues in his reply brief that"plain error" 
jurisprudence is inapplicable to this case, which he 
describes as one in which "the issue presented on appeal 
did not arise until after the district court had granted the 
government's motions under 18 U.S.C. S 3553(e) and 
U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1 and imposed sentence." According to 
Clark, "under such circumstances a party is not required to 
raise an objection before the sentencing court." To support 
this argument, Clark relies on United States v. Leung, 40 F. 
3d 577 (2d Cir. 1994). In Leung, the Second Circuit, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       sentence imposed (including a sentence below the applicable 
       guideline range), as provided in 28 U.S.C.S 994(n), by reason of 
       a defendant's "substantial assistance in the investigation or 
       prosecution of another person who has committed an offense." 
 
       (3) In Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120 (1996), the Supreme 
       Court held that the government's filing of a motion under U.S.S.G. 
       S 5K1.1, authorizing the imposition of a sentence below the 
       guidelines, does not operate to authorize a sentence below a 
       mandatory statutory minimum. The latter authorityflows only from 
       the government's filing of a motion under 18 U.S.C. S 3553(e). The 
       Melendez Court's holding appears to have accepted as its premise 
       that the statutory S 3553(e) motion and the guidelines S 5K1.1 
       motion are independent of one another, constituting a "binary" 
       rather than a "unitary" system. See 518 U.S. at 125-27. 
Accordingly, 
       Clark argues, the Melendez affir mation of the separateness of the 
       two motions confirms Clark's contention that"once the court has 
       granted a government motion under 18 U.S.C.S 3553(e) and `waived' 
       the statutory minimum, that minimum can not serve as the starting 
       point for calculating a departure under S 5K1.1." 
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speaking through Judge (then-Chief Judge) Newman, did 
remand for resentencing because of certain statements the 
sentencing judge made in the course of denying a 
downward departure and giving his rationale for the 
sentence imposed -- statements to which defense counsel 
had not registered any contemporaneous objection. As 
Clark observes, Judge Newman described the situation 
presented in Leung as "not comparable to one where a 
defendant fails to object to factual statements in a 
presentencing report . . . or fails to object to a proposed 
legal ruling regarding an application of the Sentencing 
Guidelines . . . ." But the situation presented in Leung was 
one which is also not comparable to the situation pr esented 
in the case at bar. In Leung, the sentencing judge, (a) in 
denying a downward departure and, then, (b), in explaining 
the number of months of incarceration he found 
appropriate within the applicable guideline range, had 
referred to the defendant's Canadian citizenship and 
Chinese ancestry in a manner from which, the Second 
Circuit opined, "a reasonable observer , hearing or reading 
the remarks, might infer, however incorr ectly, that Leung's 
ethnicity and alien status played a role in determining her 
sentence." 40 F. 3d at 586-87. Given that unusual set of 
circumstances, the Leung court felt that procedural 
conventions calling for contemporaneous objections to a 
sentencing judge's actions were without application. The 
court put the matter this way: 
 
        The Government argues that we should not reach the 
       merits of this issue because Leung failed to object to 
       the contested remarks at the sentencing hearing. 
       However, Leung did not forfeit her right to challenge 
       the sentencing remarks on appeal. The first r emark 
       was somewhat ambiguous, and a defendant is 
       understandably reluctant to suggest to a judge that an 
       ambiguous remark reveals bias just as the judge is 
       about to select a sentence. The second remark, which 
       referred to Leung's ethnicity and which could be 
       thought to give meaning to the first remark, occurred 
       after the sentence had been imposed. This situation is 
       not comparable to one where a defendant fails to object 
       to factual statements in a presentencing r eport, see 
       United States v. Feigenbaum, 962 F.2d 230, 233 (2d 
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       cir. 1992), or fails to object to a pr oposed legal ruling 
       regarding an application of the Sentencing Guidelines, 
       see United States v. Baez, 944 F.2d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 
       1991). In a variety of circumstances in which a party 
       could not reasonably have been expected to raise a 
       contemporaneous objection at a sentencing hearing we 
       have allowed the objection to be raised for thefirst time 
       on appeal. 
 
40 F.3d at 586. 
 
Clark's case stands in marked contrast to Leung.  In 
Clark's case, the problem posed by the sentencing judge's 
statement was the correctness of a "legal ruling regarding 
an application of the Sentencing Guidelines." And, given 
that Hayes had been decided more thanfive years, and 
Melendez nearly three years, before the day of Clark's 
sentencing, the problem was part of the overar ching 
sentencing jurisprudence and hence not a problem about 
which "a party could not reasonably have been expected to 
raise a contemporaneous objection at a sentencing 
hearing." Leung, 40 F.3d at 586. Moreover, the objection to 
be raised in Clark's case went simply to a question of law; 
it was not one which, as in Leung -- in addition to being 
occasioned by an observation from the bench not readily to 
have been anticipated -- was infused with a sensitivity that 
might well have rendered the potentially objecting party 
"understandably reluctant" (to use the Second Circuit's apt 




For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be affirmed. 
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